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THE FALSE PROMISE OF
HEALTH DATA OWNERSHIP
JORGE L. CONTRERAS*
In recent years there have been increasing calls by patient advocates, health law
scholars, and would-be data intermediaries to recognize personal property interests
in individual health information (IHI). While the propertization of IHI appeals to
notions of individual autonomy, privacy, and distributive justice, the implementa-
tion of a workable property system for IHI presents significant challenges. This
Article addresses the issues surrounding the propertization of IHI from a property
law perspective. It first observes that IHI does not fit recognized judicial criteria for
recognition as personal property, as IHI defies convenient definition, is difficult to
possess exclusively, and lacks justifications for exclusive control. Second, it argues
that if IHI property were structured along the lines of traditional common law
property, as suggested by some propertization advocates, prohibitive costs could be
imposed on socially valuable research and public health activity and IHI itself
could become mired in unanticipated administrative complexities. Third, it dis-
cusses potential limitations and exceptions on the scope, duration, and enforce-
ability of IHI property, both borrowed from intellectual property law and created
de novo for IHI.
Yet even with these limitations, inherent risks arise when a new form of property is
created. When owners are given broad rights of control, subject only to enumerated
exceptions that seek to mitigate the worst effects of that control, constitutional con-
straints on governmental takings make the subsequent refinement of those rights
difficult if not impossible, especially when rights are distributed broadly across the
entire population. Moreover, embedding a host of limitations and exceptions into a
new property system simply to avoid the worst effects of propertization begs the
question whether a property system is needed at all, particularly when existing con-
tract, privacy, and anti-discrimination rules already exist to protect individual pri-
vacy and autonomy in this area. It may be that one of the principal results of
propertizing IHI is enriching would-be data intermediaries with little net benefit to
individuals or public health. This Article concludes by recommending that the
propertization of IHI be rejected in favor of sensible governmental regulation of
IHI research coupled with existing liability rules to compensate individuals for vio-
lations of their privacy and abusive conduct by data handlers.
* Copyright © 2019 by Jorge L. Contreras, Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law,
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and a faculty workshop at Fordham Law School, and from valuable feedback by George
Annas, Nestor Davidson, Terry Fisher, Janet Freilich, Jeanne Fromer, Caroline Gentile,
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INTRODUCTION
Concerns regarding the privacy and security of personal data
have become particularly salient with respect to information about
personal health (referred to here as individual health information or
“IHI”).1 One increasingly frequent proposal that has been made to
1 I use “IHI” as an overarching term to describe a range of individual health
information including medical records, test results, clinical data, disease state, medications,
genetic sequence, vital statistics, family history, and personal demographic information.
This term should not be confused with “protected health information” or PHI, as used in
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2012). Some authors have proposed
special treatment for genetic information given its special information-carrying properties.
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address perceived risks and inequities arising from the use and han-
dling of IHI is treating it as the personal property of the individuals to
whom it relates.
Debates regarding data ownership and privacy have been
brewing in academic circles since the emergence of computers and
digital records in the 1960s,2 but it was the growth of the Internet in
the late 1990s and early 2000s that sparked widespread debate among
cyberlaw and intellectual property scholars.3 In recent years,
increasing wealth inequality and the rise of digital platforms have
fueled a renewed conversation about the ownership of personal
information.4
Joining this debate, some health law scholars have raised con-
cerns regarding individual autonomy, privacy, and distributive justice
in arguing for the propertization of genetic and other health informa-
tion.5 In his bestselling book The Patient Will See You Now, cardiolo-
See, e.g., Ellen Wright Clayton et al., The Law of Genetic Privacy: Applications,
Implications, and Limitations, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 7–10 (2019) (describing the history
of “genetic exceptionalism”); Patricia A. Roche & George J. Annas, Protecting Genetic
Privacy, 2 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 392, 393 (2001) (“[G]enetic information can radically
change the way people view themselves . . . as well as the way that others view them.”).
This Article, however, treats all health information in a uniform manner.
2 See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324 (1967) (“[P]ersonal information
. . . should be defined as a property right . . . .”); Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the
Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67
MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1223–26 (1969) (challenging Westin and others and criticizing the use
of property law to protect privacy as “facile”).
3 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 156–63
(1999) (proposing a property-based framework to protect personal online privacy); Julie E.
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1373, 1379 (2000) (recognizing some benefits of propertization of personal data); Jessica
Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1313 (2000)
(“[P]ursuing a tort law strategy for privacy protection would be better than a property
rights approach not because it would be especially effective, but rather because it would be
comparatively benign.”); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight:
Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 81 (1996)
(“Since the persona is identifiable to a specific individual, the electronic persona is ‘owned’
by that person . . . . It is this very identifiability which makes it property.”); Paul M.
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2056 (2004)
(proposing a five-part framework defining rights in personal information).
4 JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY AND THE NEW DIGITAL
SERFDOM 3, 8 (2017) (“If we do not take back our ownership rights from software
companies and overreaching governments, we will become digital peasants.”); ERIC A.
POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 241–49 (2018) (advocating labor-based payments to
individuals for uploading and classifying online data without direct recourse to property
arguments).
5 See, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1105, 1164–67 (2018) (promoting a “progressive” view of propertized health data that
incorporates “plural values, communitarian interests, and distributive justice”).
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gist and patient advocate Eric Topol asserts that “[t]he ownership of
property is essential to emancipation. It’s unquestionably appropriate,
a self-evident truth, that each individual is entitled to own all of his or
her medical data.”6 Popular awareness of these issues has been fueled,
among other things, by the story of Henrietta Lacks, an indigent
African-American cancer patient whose excised tumor cells formed
the basis of a multi-billion dollar industry while her descendants con-
tinued to live in poverty.7 At least six U.S. states have enacted legisla-
tion purporting to grant individuals ownership of their genetic
information (though one has since repealed that legislation).8 And
even former President Barack Obama once opined that “if somebody
does a test on me or my genes . . . that’s mine.”9
But the push toward individual data ownership has gained the
most momentum thanks to a new crop of technology-focused startups.
In a global health data market worth an estimated sixty-seven to one
hundred billion dollars per year,10 these aspiring data intermediaries
6 ERIC TOPOL, THE PATIENT WILL SEE YOU NOW 281 (2016). See infra notes 19–21,
discussing Dr. Topol’s non-profit company formed to promote this position.
7 REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 1–7 (2010). Skloot’s
book was also adapted as an HBO movie starring Oprah Winfrey, further extending its
reach into the popular awareness. THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (HBO
Films, 2017).
8 See Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic Information: One Size
Privacy or Property Models May Not Fit All, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 175, 195–98 (2013)
(discussing laws in Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida). Oregon, the first
state to enact legislation recognizing a property interest in genetic information, repealed
this law in 2001. Compare Genetic Privacy, 2001 Or. Laws ch. 588, § 2 (codified as
amended at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.537 (West 2019)) (repealing property provisions),
with Genetic Privacy Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659.715(1) (West 1997) (“[A]n
individual’s genetic information and DNA sample are the property of the individual except
when the information or sample is used in anonymous research.”). See also GENETIC
RESEARCH ADVISORY COMM., ASSURING GENETIC PRIVACY IN OREGON 10–11 (2000)
[hereinafter Oregon Report] (recommending repeal), https://digital.osl.state.or.us/
islandora/object/osl%3A1980; OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., HISTORY OF OREGON’S GENETIC
PRIVACY LAW 3–4 (2007), https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/DiseasesConditions/
GeneticConditions/Documents/LAW_ORHxPrivacy.pdf.
9 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, President Weighs In on Data from Genes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/us/politics/president-obama-weighs-in-on-
data-from-genes.html. But see Jorge L. Contreras, Letter to the Editor: The President Says
Patients Should Own Their Genetic Data. He’s Wrong., 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 585
(2016) (critiquing President’s statement).
10 See Joyce E. Cutler, How Can Patients Make Money Off Their Medical Data,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 29, 2019, 5:46 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-
sciences/how-can-patients-make-money-off-their-medical-data; Sara Merken & Dana A.
Elfin, What’s Your Health Data Worth? Startups Want to Help You Sell It, BLOOMBERG L.
(Oct. 31, 2018) https://biglawbusiness.com/whats-your-health-data-worth-startups-want-to-
help-you-sell-it (“The worldwide market for patient medical data is potentially huge, with
estimates running as high as $67 billion.”).
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seek to use Blockchain11 and mobile apps to enable consumers to con-
trol, and get paid for, the use of their IHI, and in the process retain a
healthy portion of the proceeds.12 These firms include Nebula
Genomics (co-founded by Harvard Medical School professor and
genomics pioneer George Church),13 Genos (a spin-out from Chinese
sequencing giant BGI-Shenzhen),14 DNAsimple (a recent contestant
on the ABC television show Shark Tank),15 Invitae (seeking to sell
“genome management” services),16 and LunaDNA (backed by equip-
ment manufacturer Illumina).17 The motivations of these firms may be
summed up by the Chairman of Genos, who has publicly stated that
“our business is to make money enabling researchers and individuals
to connect and transact with each other.”18
In a less commercial vein, Unpatient.org, a short-lived not-for-
profit effort by Topol and Leonard Kish, sought to empower patients
through data ownership.19 Unpatient.org released its own “Data
11 Blockchain refers to a distributed ledger technology that enables trusted and
authenticated electronic transactions without the need for centralized administration. See
Tsung-Ting Kuo, Hyeon-Eui Kim & Lucila Ohno-Machado, Blockchain Distributed Ledger
Technologies for Biomedical and Health Care Applications, 24 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS
ASS’N 1211, 1214 (2017) (summarizing key benefits of adopting blockchain technology in
biomedical and health care applications as “(1) decentralized management, (2) immutable
audit trail, (3) data provenance, (4) robustness/availability, and (5) security/privacy”).
12 See Merken & Elfin, supra note 10; Megan Molteni, These DNA Startups Want to
Put All of You on the Blockchain, WIRED (Nov. 16, 2018) https://www.wired.com/story/
these-dna-startups-want-to-put-all-of-you-on-the-blockchain (“In the last three years,
nearly 150 companies building biomedical blockchain applications have raised more than
$660 million in the private and cryptocurrency markets. About a quarter of those projects
aim to be decentralized clearinghouses for various kinds of health data.”).
13 See John Lauerman, This Startup Is Building a Market to Help You Sell Your DNA
Data, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2018, 9:34 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-08-29/put-a-price-on-your-dna-data-with-this-harvard-professor-s-firm; Megan
Scudellari, Get Paid for Your Genetic Data, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 2018), https://
ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8322030.
14 Misha Angrist, Do You Belong to You?, GENOME MAG. (Jan. 2, 2018), http://
genomemag.com/do-you-belong-to-you.
15 See Ali Montag, This Company Will Pay You $50 for Your Spit—And Mark Cuban
Just Invested $200,000 on ‘Shark Tank,’ CNBC (Nov. 13, 2017, 12:56 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2017/11/13/mark-cuban-invested-200000-in-dna-simple-on-shark-tank-
heres-why.html; see also Roberts, supra note 5, at n.217.
16 See Jessica L. Roberts, Stacey Pereira & Amy L. McGuire, Letter to the Editor:
Should You Profit from Your Genome?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 18, 18 (2017).
17 Kristen V. Brown, Share Your DNA, Get Shares: Startup Files an Unusual Offering,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2018, 8:46 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-
05/illumina-backed-startup-asks-sec-to-let-it-pay-people-for-dna.
18 Roberts, Pereira & McGuire, supra note 16, at 18 (quoting Chairman Cliff Reid).
19 See Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, Unpatients – Why Patients Should Own Their
Medical Data, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 921, 923 (2015). By December 2018, the
Unpatient.org website was no longer active. According to one of the co-founders,
Unpatient.org has suspended operations, but hopes to continue to advance patient privacy
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Ownership Manifesto”20 which proclaimed that “[d]ata that reflects
you should belong to you,” rather than to healthcare providers and
pharmaceutical companies.21
But perhaps the most intriguing addition to the propertization
camp is Hu-manity.org, which approaches the issue of data propertiza-
tion from the perspective of international human rights, arguing that a
“31st human right” in personal data ownership should be recognized
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,22 following from
which individuals should be able to sell, and profit from, access to
their data.23
In each of these business models, the aspiring data intermediary
acts as the consumer’s authorized agent in selling or licensing her IHI
to healthcare providers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and anyone
else interested in it, remitting a share of the revenue back to the con-
sumer and, of course, retaining a portion for itself. While the idea that
consumers, as a matter of equity and distributive fairness, should
share in the profits earned from the use of their data is not a new
one,24 it is only today, with the advent of technologies such as
Blockchain and pervasive mobile connectivity, that markets in IHI
have become feasible.
Though there are differences among these proposed offerings, an
individual who signed up with one of these data intermediaries would
be given the ability to opt-in to one or more research studies and con-
as the technology matures. E-mail from Leonard J. Kish, Co-Founder, Unpatient.org, to
author (Mar. 21, 2019) (on file with author).
20 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 1151 (describing Unpatient Health Data Ownership
Manifesto).
21 Id.
22 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights currently recognizes thirty fundamental
human rights, several of which (such as the rights to privacy, liberty, and property) may
already, though imperfectly, address concerns regarding control over one’s own electronic
data. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 3, 12, 17
(Dec. 10, 1948).
23 See Ron Miller, Hu-manity Wants to Create a Health Data Marketplace with Help
from Blockchain, TECHCRUNCH (July 18, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/18/hu-
manity-wants-to-create-a-health-data-marketplace-with-help-from-blockchain (explaining
that consumers will be able to provide their data to researchers in exchange for a fee).
24 See, e.g., ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? FROM PRIVACY TO
PUBLIC ACCESS 29 (1994) (“If such information has economic value, we should receive
something of value in return for its use by others.”); Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy:
Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 50 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997); Mark A.
Hall & Kevin A. Schulman, Ownership of Medical Information, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1282, 1284 (2009) (proposing a trading market in IHI); Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy,
and the Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631, 659–63
(2010) (discussing ownership of medical records).
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tribute all or a portion of her stored data to the study.25 In some cases,
an individual may not wish to share certain types of information, such
as a family history of schizophrenia or an HIV-positive diagnosis. In
that case, the intermediary could screen the studies offered to the
individual or exclude IHI relating to the sensitive subject area.
DNAsimple advertises that it will pay donors for saliva samples to
help genetic disease research.26 Genos estimates that IHI payments to
consumers would be in the range of $50 to $250,27 while LunaDNA
offers participants a mere $3.50 for the use of their genetic marker
data and $21 for a full genomic sequence.28
The linchpin of this new business model is the recognition of an
individual’s ownership of IHI. Without it, companies, hospitals,
insurers, and data intermediaries can (and today do) aggregate and
sell individual health information without consulting, or paying, the
individual.29 But if consumers owned their data, anyone who tried to
use or sell it without permission would be stealing (or at least con-
verting) that data. Ownership of IHI would potentially invest individ-
uals with powerful and legally enforceable mechanisms to prevent
intrusion, appropriation, and exploitation of information that they do
not wish to share—authority that seems particularly desirable in
today’s world of untrammeled data exploitation.
Recognizing a property right in IHI, of course, would represent a
significant departure from current U.S. law,30 which has held for more
than a century that data—objective information and facts—cannot be
25 See, e.g., DNAsimple, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/dnasimple/about
(last visited July 21, 2019) (describing one company’s options for study participation);
Molteni, supra note 12 (same).
26 DNAsimple, supra note 25.
27 Angrist, supra note 14, at 45.
28 Julian Segert, Understanding Ownership and Privacy of Genetic Data, HARV. UNIV.
SCI. IN THE NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2018/understanding-
ownership-privacy-genetic-data. One reporter who investigated a number of personal
health data sites came to the conclusion that the amounts paid were so small as to make
them not worth the effort. Kristen V. Brown, How I Got Cash, Gift Cards and
Cryptocurrency for My DNA Data, Bloomberg Prognosis Podcast, Episode 13 (May 23,
2019).
29 Kish & Topol, supra note 19, at 921.
30 In the United States, property law is traditionally a matter of state common law,
while certain intellectual property rights (e.g., copyright and patent) are governed by
federal statutory law. Proposals for the propertization of health data are generally not
specific as to whether the new property right would be created under state or federal law,
though, as discussed in note 8, supra, some state laws have already been enacted in this
regard. Finally, while the focus of this Article is on U.S. law, similar discussions regarding
data propertization have been occurring in Europe, Canada, and elsewhere. See Teresa
Scassa, Data Ownership 14–16 (CIGI, Paper No. 187, 2018) (discussing EU consideration
of sui generis data protection regulations and Canadian positions).
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owned as property.31 As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote, facts are “free
as the air to common use.”32 This longstanding rule has been applied
consistently to information ranging from the news of the day,33 stock
recommendations,34 and sports scores35 to the sequence of naturally
occurring human DNA.36 The federal court in Greenberg v. Miami
Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc. expressly rejected
property-based claims under which the plaintiffs sought a share of the
profits made using discoveries based on their children’s genetic data.37
Thus, under current law, facts—raw information about the world—
once generally known, cannot be owned.
Some who advocate for individual ownership of IHI argue that
data ownership is nothing new: institutions already “own” data in the
form of trade secrets, copyrighted material, and medical records.38
They argue that if there is no legal impediment to institutions owning
personal data, why, then, should there be any objection to individuals
owning the same data?39 Yet, contrary to these assertions, the laws of
copyright, trade secret, databases, and patents do not, in fact, create a
property interest in IHI.40 Thus, the invocation of these related bodies
of law resists, rather than supports, the application of intellectual
31 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) (holding that
information about current events cannot be copyrighted); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1991) (explaining that it is a basic axiom of copyright law
that authors cannot copyright facts). The refusal to recognize a property interest in data is
not unique to the United States. See, e.g., John Rumbold & Barbara Pierscionek, Why
Patients Shouldn’t ‘Own’ Their Medical Records, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 586 (2016)
(discussing applicability to the UK and EU); Scassa, supra note 30, at 14–16 (discussing
EU and Canadian perspectives).
32 Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33 See id. at 234 (majority opinion).
34 Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 344–45 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), rev’d in part, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
35 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846–47 (2d Cir. 1997).
36 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
37 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
38 See, e.g., Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, Reply to Why Patients Shouldn’t ‘Own’
Their Medical Records, 34 NATURE BIOTECH. 586, 586 (2016) (“[R]esearch data are often
considered IP and are covered as a trade secret, or copyrighted. . . . The bottom line is that
personal data are already viewed as property in a variety of contexts.”).
39 See id. at 587 (“There rarely seems to be debate on whether or not institutions can
‘own’ data, but questions arise when it comes to individuals and their personal data.”).
40 See Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 381 n.66 (2012) (arguing that personal information does
not fit existing IP categories “as it involves no invention or innovation that would make it
patentable, it lacks the originality and creativity that would make it eligible for copyright
protection, and it is not the sort of secret business information that would make it a trade
secret”); Cohen, supra note 3, at 1387 (arguing that intellectual property law does not
provide a basis for assigning a property interest in personal data, because, unlike
intellectual property law, incentives are not relevant to discussions of personal data).
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property law frameworks to human health data. Because no existing
legal regime provides a suitable framework for the ownership of IHI,
IHI would have to fall under a de novo form of personal intangible
property.
Numerous scholars have argued against the creation of a new
form of personal property covering individual data. Their objections
range from moral and dignitary concerns over commodification of the
individual,41 to utilitarian concerns about barriers that individual own-
ership of health information could impose on biomedical research42
and its potential impact on patient safety and public health,43 to a
sense that the propertization of IHI is unnecessary in view of existing
common law and regulatory protections of individual privacy and
safety.44
But, as noted above, the current movement toward ownership of
IHI is driven, to an increasing degree, by concerns over privacy,
autonomy, and distributive justice.45 These core ethical considerations
are difficult to balance against a “communitarian” instrumental anal-
ysis.46 Thus, even if granting individuals ownership over IHI is likely
to impede scientific research and public health monitoring, this cost
41 See, e.g., Baron, supra note 40, at 397–99 (“If personal information connects in
important ways to our selves, then trading it has the potential to undermine our
identity. . . .”); Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper
Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 798–811 (2004) (explaining
that certain things, such as human tissue, should never be alienable on dignitary grounds).
These arguments draw upon Radin’s seminal work on property and personhood. Margaret
Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885 (1987).
42 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Genetic Property, 105 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (2016); Richard A.
Spinello, Property Rights in Genetic Information, 6 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 29, 35–36
(2004); Cohen, supra note 3, at 1388 n.50.
43 See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Is There a Duty to Share Healthcare Data?, in BIG DATA,
HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 209, 216–17 (I. Glenn Cohen et al., eds., 2018); Jorge L.
Contreras & Francisca Nordfalk, Liability (and) Rules for Health Information, 29 HEALTH
MATRIX J.L. MED. 179 (2019); Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the
Public Interest, 36 AM. J.L. MED. & ETHICS 586, 589 (2010).
44 See Barbara J. Evans, Barbarians at the Gate: Consumer-Driven Health Data
Commons and the Transformation of Citizen Science, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 651 (2016)
(protections sought through property law already exist in the regulatory frameworks that
govern medical records and research); Barbara J. Evans, Would Patient Ownership of
Health Data Improve Confidentiality?, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 724, 728 (2012)
(“There are few discernible differences between the level of confidentiality patients would
enjoy if they owned their data . . . and what they presently have under the HIPAA Privacy
Rule and the Common Rule.”).
45 See Roberts, supra note 5, at 1164–67.
46 See, e.g., id. at 1145–48 (“Informed consent is . . . decidedly anti-utilitarian and can
lead to outcomes that favor individual rights over wealth creation and net social welfare.”);
see also Cohen, supra note 3, at 1428–49 (making reference to the “communitarian” strain
of argument in debates over data ownership).
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may be acceptable to those who value personal privacy and autonomy
above aggregate net benefits to society.
This Article thus asks whether IHI should be recognized as prop-
erty not from a purely instrumental standpoint, but from an internal
property law perspective: Is propertized IHI workable under property
law? Part I first considers whether IHI possesses the characteristics of
property that courts have recognized when considering whether other
types of intangibles should be recognized as property. Part II con-
siders what propertized IHI might look like, situating IHI within the
traditional common law rules of personal property and assessing how
different attributes of existing property frameworks—exclusivity, infi-
nite duration, divisibility, alienability and the like—might be applied
to IHI. Concluding that traditional common law property rules would
result in numerous problems if applied to IHI, Part III considers
whether certain limitations and exceptions on the scope and enforce-
ability of propertized IHI, derived both from adjacent areas such as
patent and copyright law and from the unique nature of IHI itself,
could beneficially be applied to an IHI property framework. This
Article concludes by recognizing that while a set of limitations and
exceptions applied to an otherwise traditional common law IHI prop-
erty framework might address some of the issues raised by IHI
propertization, the need for such a constrained property system is less
than clear.
I
DOES IHI POSSESS THE ATTRIBUTES OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY?
In assessing the applicability of common law property rules to
IHI, it is first useful to understand the characteristics of IHI through a
property law lens. As explained in one property law casebook, “To
create a system of property rights, a legal system needs to be able to
identify the things that are the subject of those rights, to decide who
owns those things, and to be able to say when an owner’s rights have
been violated.”47 And as the Ninth Circuit has noted, a property
interest “need not be one that was considered property at common
law and, of course, need not be tangible.”48 Thus, in considering
whether and to what degree a property interest can be recognized in
47 JEREMY SHEFF, OPEN SOURCE PROPERTY: A FREE CASEBOOK 68 (2019) (ebook).
48 G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 902 (9th
Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
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IHI, some attention must be paid to what “thing” will be considered
the res subject to that interest.49
Over the years, courts have considered whether or not to recog-
nize property interests in a variety of intangible assets when analyzing
the applicability of different legal doctrines. For example, courts have
evaluated whether a particular intangible is “property” to determine
whether a regulatory curtailment of that intangible constitutes a gov-
ernmental taking requiring the payment of compensation under
the Fifth Amendment and the observation of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.50 Other courts have been required to con-
sider whether an intangible is property in order to determine the
applicability of statutes pertaining to mail fraud,51 copyright infringe-
ment,52 and conversion,53 as well as the division of matrimonial prop-
erty in divorce.54
Intangibles that courts have deemed to be property in one con-
text or another include shares in a corporation,55 information in a cus-
tomer list,56 Internet domain names,57 taxi operating licenses,58
professional football franchises,59 aviation safety innovations,60 busi-
ness franchises,61 medical degrees,62 and celebrity status.63 Intangibles
that courts have not deemed to be property include hot news,64 infor-
49 See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691,
1691–92 (2012) (grounding property law in tangible and intangible “things”). But see
Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183, 194–98
(2017) (describing ongoing debate among property theorists regarding the extent to which
“things” should be considered the gravamen of property law).
50 See, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
51 United States v. Turoff, 701 F. Supp. 981, 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
52 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234–35 (1918).
53 See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1074–76 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal.
1990); Palm Springs-La Quinta Dev. Co. v. Kieberk Corp., 115 P.2d 548, 551–52 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1941).
54 See Allen M. Parkman, Human Capital as Property in Celebrity Divorces, 29 FAMILY
L.Q. 141, 145–46 (1995).
55 Payne v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 339, 342 (1880).
56 See Palm Springs-La Quinta Dev. Co., 115 P.2d at 551–52 (recognizing cause of
action for conversion of real estate developer’s “lead cards”).
57 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
58 United States v. Turoff, 701 F. Supp. 981, 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
59 City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 837–39 (Cal. 1982).
60 G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th
Cir. 1992).
61 Hatfield v. Straus, 82 N.E. 172, 176 (N.Y. 1907).
62 O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
63 Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A. 2d 1040 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Elkus v. Elkus,
572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1991); Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
64 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918).
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mation gleaned from study of an individual’s tissue,65 laundry routes,66
the right to have an employment agreement renewed,67 the right to
have a restraining order enforced by the police,68 the government’s
right to regulate arms sales,69 and citizens’ right to good
government.70
In Kremen v. Cohen,71 the Ninth Circuit applied a three-part test
to determine whether a property interest should be recognized in an
intangible—the “medallion” license issued to authorized taxi
drivers—for takings purposes. While not all cases determining
whether a particular intangible should be invested with the attributes
of property are takings cases, takings cases have a well-developed ana-
lytical framework exemplified by Kremen. In addition, takings cases
appear to give the most thought to the actual property-like attributes
of the intangible under consideration, whereas cases involving issues
such as mail fraud and divorce settlement often focus more on the
conduct of the parties.72 Thus, it is appropriate to consider the frame-
work adopted by courts in takings cases when analyzing more gener-
ally whether an intangible such as IHI should be invested with the
attributes of personal property.
Of course, current proposals to propertize IHI go beyond even
the results of recognition of a property interest for takings purposes.
Such proposals seek to invest IHI with all of the rights and benefits of
common law property, building a new property regime from scratch.
This approach is thus more legislative than judicial, and legislative
approaches ideally involve greater refinement and tailoring than judi-
cial recognition of property interests for takings or other limited pur-
65 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1074–76 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing a conversion claim based on unauthorized use of
donated genetic information); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493
(Cal. 1990) (holding no conversion claim existed for unauthorized use of patient’s cells and
information discovered thereby).
66 Olschewski v. Hudson, 262 P. 43 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
67 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (interpreting “property”
for due process purposes).
68 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (interpreting “property”
for due process purposes).
69 See United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988) (interpreting “property” for
purposes of applying the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012)).
70 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (interpreting “property” for purposes
of applying § 1341), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 602 Stat. 4181 (1988), as
recognized in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
71 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
72 Compare Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (takings), with Elkus
v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904–05 (App. Div. 1991) (divorce).
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poses.73 Nevertheless, considering the questions that courts have
asked regarding the recognition of property interests in particular
intangibles for takings purposes is at least a useful first step in the
analysis of a property interest in IHI.
Though slightly different tests have been adopted by other
courts,74 the Ninth Circuit’s test in Kremen is among the most well-
articulated and analytically rigorous of takings-type property
frameworks. This Article thus considers the case for propertization of
IHI in view of the Kremen analysis.
Kremen provides the following three-part framework for
assessing the property-like nature of an intangible: “First, there must
be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it must be capable
of exclusive possession or control; and third, the putative owner must
have established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.”75
A. Is IHI Capable of Precise Definition?
Proponents of IHI propertization do not generally speak in terms
of protection for an aggregated body of data, as do database protec-
tion regulations in Europe and elsewhere,76 nor in terms of the secrecy
of IHI, as does trade secret law.77 Rather, the “thing” at the root of
the proposed IHI property right is information itself. The smallest unit
of such property would constitute an individual datum, a single ele-
ment of IHI: a blood pressure reading on a given date, the results of a
particular diagnostic test, or the existence of a known mutation in
one’s DNA.
73 For discussions of proposals for legislative recognition of property interests in
different forms of intangibles, see, for example, C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The
Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2009), which proposes
protection of fashion designs; J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually
Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual
Property Environment, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 315, which discusses
debate over proposed database protection legislation in the United States; and Pamela
Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip
Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1986), which compares protection for
computer software to sui generis protection for semiconductor layouts.
74 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (describing
how the Supreme Court requires a person with a “property interest in a benefit” to “have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it”).
75 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 (citing G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying
Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1992)).
76 See, e.g., Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L77) 24–25.
77 See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(a) (2012) (requiring that for information to be
considered a trade secret, “the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret”)).
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But can such data be precisely defined at the individual level?
One nettlesome question is when an ownable datum of IHI is created.
That is, if one owns a piece of property, it is important in many con-
texts (e.g., transfer, encumbrance, bankruptcy, divorce, inheritance) to
know when the property came into existence. For example, suppose
that you wake up one morning with a fever of 104° and a large, red
sore on your forehead. At least two important new pieces of health
information about you have been created. Is your awareness of these
health data required to instantiate them, or do they have an indepen-
dent and objective existence? Or suppose when you wake up you
realize that you have a fever, yet you do not own a thermometer. You
do not know that your fever is 104° until your temperature is taken at
your primary care provider’s office a few hours later. When does your
temperature become an ownable piece of property: when your fever
struck last night, when you awoke feeling unwell, when your tempera-
ture was taken, or when a clerk entered your temperature into a med-
ical record?
Conscious awareness of property is generally not required for it
to exist. You may own a piece of land in fee simple with no knowledge
of the gold deposits beneath it, yet under the common law of property
the gold is indisputably yours. Yet even when the acquirer of property
is not consciously aware of the precise nature of the property, it is
generally not difficult to define what the property is and when owner-
ship of the property passed to the acquirer. Even works of great origi-
nality do not constitute copyrighted works of authorship until they are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression (e.g., written, recorded, or
electronically stored).78
So what of IHI? Is your unrecorded temperature in the middle of
the night a datum that qualifies as property when no human, yourself
included, is aware of it? If the basis for treating IHI as property
derives from one’s inherent right to own all information about oneself,
then it seems that unfixed, unknown information should, indeed, be
considered property. Yet the practical difficulties associated with this
extreme version of ownership are significant. For example, how many
data are created during the night while you suffer from feverish
dreams? Is a new piece of IHI property created every hour? Every
minute? Every second? A veritable Zeno’s paradox emerges in the
fruitless attempt to define the property interests inherent in this
simple fact. Such considerations tend to refute the character of
78 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see id. § 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of
expression when its embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.”).
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unknown, unfixed IHI as “capable of precise definition” under the
Kremen standard.
B. Is IHI Capable of Exclusive Possession or Control?
Even if is it possible to identify IHI in a manner “capable of pre-
cise definition,” problems emerge under the second Kremen factor,
which asks whether the right is “capable of exclusive possession or
control.”79 The exclusive possession and control requirement harkens
back to the Blackstonian notion of property as “that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in
the universe.”80 Today of course there are many limitations on the
property owner’s “sole and despotic dominion,” as a host of govern-
mental regulations concerning the environment, health and safety,
illegal activity, and public functions, as well as private covenants,
duties, and the like limit what we may and may not do with our prop-
erty. Yet, even with these important caveats, a fundamental attribute
of property remains the right to exclude others from its enjoyment.
But how does such exclusion occur? Physical property may be
locked away or hidden. Intangibles like money and financial accounts
can be secured behind electronic firewalls and entrusted to
intermediaries such as banks. Can the same be said of IHI? At the
outset, much information about one’s health can only be learned by
the outside world if the individual discloses it directly (“I feel dizzy”)
or consents to its discernment by a third party, usually a healthcare
provider (e.g., an eye exam, a blood draw, an MRI). Thus, prior to the
discernment of an element of IHI by a third party, it seems capable of
exclusive possession or control.
But how excludable is this information once it is disclosed? In
economic terms, once information is communicated, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to contain.81 Thus, once a physician measures a
patient’s pulse or views an x-ray image of his chest, she is prohibited
by applicable law from disclosing it to others, but can she be pre-
vented from knowing or using that information in the future?82 As
79 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing G.S. Rasmussen, 958
F.2d at 903).
80 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. Some scholars have challenged the
absolutist nature of exclusivity that has generally been ascribed to Blackstone. See, e.g.,
Wyman, supra note 49, at 219 n.108.
81 See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge
Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO
PRACTICE 8–9 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007).
82 A physician may, of course, have ethical or legal duties not to disclose patient health
information. But while the violation of these duties may give rise to other forms of liability
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explained by Glenn Cohen, it may be both practically difficult and
generally unwise to allow such a right to exclude:
When a physician who is a textbook author writes up a case study of
a disease . . . that is a composite of what he has learned from the
twenty patients he has seen with the disorder, must he specifically
ask each of the patients for his or her consent? Imagine that it is not
twenty patients, but at the end of his career, it is every patient he
has ever treated, thousands or tens of thousands; must he seek con-
sent from each individual patient in order to use the knowledge he
has gleaned? . . . My primary care physician . . . has undoubtedly
seen thousands of patients in his career so far . . . . When he treats
me, it is not only my expectation but indeed my fervent hope that
he uses that prior experience in helping to treat me. If I were to say
to him, “Thank you very much for the help on the bronchitis today,
doctor, but I want your solemn pledge that you will forget every-
thing you learned in this encounter and never use that knowledge to
help another patient,” I know of no physician who would agree to
this, were it even possible.83
This discussion suggests that IHI may not be amenable to exclu-
sive possession and control as conceptualized under Kremen.
C. Does an “Owner” of IHI Have a Legitimate Claim to
Exclusivity?
The third Kremen factor requires consideration of whether a
putative property owner has a legitimate claim to exclusive control
over the proposed item of property.84 As explained by the Supreme
Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, “[t]o have a prop-
erty interest . . . a person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation
of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”85
In G.S. Rasmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Services,
Inc., the Ninth Circuit, drawing on the Supreme Court’s Fifth
Amendment takings jurisprudence, explicitly refers to the “reasonable
investment-backed expectations” of a prospective property owner in
deciding whether or not the owner had a legitimate claim to exclu-
sivity in an aviation safety certification.86 Based in large part on the
“considerable time and effort in research and design” expended by
for the physician, they do not themselves prevent the use or dissemination of the disclosed
information by others once they have received it. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 496–97 (Cal. 1990).
83 Cohen, supra note 43, at 214–15 (citations and emphasis omitted).
84 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030.
85 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
86 958 F.2d at 903 n.13 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984)).
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the would-be property owner, the Ninth Circuit recognized his prop-
erty interest.87 Likewise, the court in Kremen found that domain
name registrants expend “substantial time and money to develop and
promote websites that depend on their domain names.”88 These
expenditures supported a “legitimate claim to exclusivity” by domain
name registrants, and the court accordingly recognized a property
interest in domain name registrations.89
In the case of IHI, however, the individual who is the source of
the information typically expends little or no effort to create it. IHI is
largely descriptive information about an individual, not information
that the individual spent time, effort, or money to develop. In most
cases, this information is discovered and recorded by skilled profes-
sionals (physicians, pathologists, medical examiners) who then analyze
it without material assistance from the individual. As a result, IHI is
more characteristic of something that an individual has an “abstract
need or desire” to own, rather than something as to which the indi-
vidual possesses a legitimate expectation of exclusive control.90
Cohen’s discussion as explained in Section I.B, above, illustrates
why, in many contexts, a rational patient would not seek to enforce
exclusivity against a physician who has obtained IHI from her, even if
she could. In addition to individual self-interest, social welfare consid-
erations limit the legitimacy of an individual’s assertion of exclusive
rights over IHI. For example, as discussed elsewhere, individual own-
ership of IHI could impede public health research, monitoring, and
response by preventing physicians from communicating important
87 Id. at 903.
88 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030.
89 Id. at 1030.
90 For similar reasons, even the old property law chestnut—Locke’s labor theory—fails
to support the legitimacy of an individual’s claim to exclusive control over her IHI. Locke
begins with the premise that one owns one’s body and the fruits of his labor. JOHN LOCKE,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 111 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690)
(“[E]very man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself.
The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”). But as
Glenn Cohen notes, information about a person (what color shirt he is wearing, how she
reacts to a particular medication) is not the person and is thus not captured within the
initial premise of Locke’s theory. Cohen, supra note 43, at 212–14. Moreover, because a
person expends no effort (labor) to generate health information about herself, Locke’s
argument that one should own the fruits of one’s labor also fails with respect to such data.
Id.; see also Cohen, supra note 3, at 1380–81 (casting doubt on Lockean justifications for
recognizing a property right to personal data); Spinello, supra note 42, at 37 (same); Jacob
S. Sherkow, Letter to the Editor, Whose Genes Are They Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/19/opinion/l19genes.html (“Imagine . . . a medical
patient had a gene that could cure AIDS, but he prevented researchers from studying it
because it came from his body. He didn’t “invent” his genes . . . . Should society be able to
compel him to make his genes available for scientific study?”).
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health-related observations (e.g., outbreaks of infectious diseases, new
strains of flu, previously unknown symptoms, adverse drug reactions)
to public health authorities and by preventing public health authori-
ties from using and acting upon that information.91 In addition, the
assertion of exclusive rights to data about oneself is likely to impede
socially valuable biomedical research.92 Though Kremen and related
cases frame the legitimacy analysis in economic terms and generally
do not speak in terms of balancing of social interests, the legitimacy of
one’s claim to own a particular thing should, at least in part, reflect the
social costs and benefits of that ownership. Thus, the legitimacy of
individual ownership of IHI may also be challenged on the basis of its
potential social harm.
II
IHI AS PERSONAL PROPERTY
As discussed in Part I above, serious questions exist regarding the
characterization of IHI as personal property under the Kremen test.
But even if not recognized as property by the courts, the legislature
may create new forms of property through sui generis legislation.
In the debate over propertization of IHI, little has been said
about what, precisely, an IHI property system would look like. Non-
legal advocates appear to view the terms “property” and “ownership”
as self-evident and not in need of further elaboration or refinement.
For example, Hu-manity seeks to “bestow the legal characteristics of
property ownership to inherent human data” without explaining what
these characteristics should be.93 And while these statements may be
discounted as mere advocacy, even the enacted statutory language of
some states that have sought to propertize genetic data94 is woefully
imprecise. For example, Colorado provides, without further elabora-
tion, that “[g]enetic information is the unique property of the indi-
vidual to whom the information pertains;”95 and Georgia provides,
with equal brevity, that “[g]enetic information is the unique property
of the individual tested.”96 These and other state statutes contain no
limitations or constraints on the scope of the property right that is
91 See, e.g., Rodwin, supra note 43, at 599–607; Contreras & Nordfalk, supra note 43, at
194.
92 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
93 Hu-manity.co, https://hu-manity.co (last visited Apr. 18, 2019); see also Kish &
Topol, supra note 19, at 924 (identifying the author’s goal as “urgently seek[ing] to
promote ownership of one’s medical data” without explanation of proposed legal
mechanisms).
94 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
95 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (West 2019).
96 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (West 2019).
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purportedly created, nor does the limited case law that has developed
under these cases shed any light on these critical questions.97 Thus,
this Article examines how IHI would be propertized under a tradi-
tional framework for personal property at a doctrinal level not previ-
ously addressed in the literature. Doing so reveals significant, and
possibly intractable, structural issues with the attempt to propertize
IHI in this manner.
A. Alienation and Divisibility
In addition to the right to exclude discussed in Part I above,
another fundamental right enjoyed by property owners is the ability to
alienate (transfer or sell) their property.98 The right of alienation has
long been viewed as one of the most important rights associated with
property, and courts have gone to great lengths to avoid even consen-
sual restrictions of an owner’s right to alienate.99 Indeed, some
scholars have proposed that property rights be recognized in IHI pre-
cisely to encourage the creation of trading markets in such data.100
Yet as Baron points out, some may object to the fact that the
recipient of their IHI (e.g., a healthcare provider) may freely transfer
that IHI to others (e.g., research institutions, pharmaceutical compa-
nies, insurers—all subject to applicable regulatory restrictions).101 To
counteract the effect of free alienability by downstream possessors of
personal data, scholars have proposed modified formulations of the
right to alienate that derive from the inherent divisibility of property
rights.102 Divisibility of property rights manifests itself in different
97 See, e.g., Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd., No. 1:14-cv-00004, 2017 WL 2838256, at *5 (D.
Alaska June 30, 2017) (denying a motion to dismiss suit brought under similar Alaska
statute because the disclosure of plaintiff’s DNA test results without his consent “is
sufficiently ‘concrete’ so as to confer Article III standing”).
98 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 232–33 (8th ed. 2014). Cf. Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931,
932–33 (1985) (describing limited circumstances in which property should be subject to
restraints on alienation).
99 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 489 cmt. A (AM. LAW INST. 1944); see, e.g.,
Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82 v. Toscano, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816, 817 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(“Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void.”
(quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 711)).
100 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
101 Baron, supra note 40, at 382 (“[I]ndividuals rarely understand the kind and range of
uses that might later be made of the information they are selling. In the context of personal
information, alienability, ordinarily thought to be welfare-enhancing, becomes something
more like a trap for the unwary.”); see also OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., supra note 8, at 8
(citing free alienability as a factor weighing against recognition of property rights in genetic
data).
102 See Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for Technological
Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057, 1061 (2013) (“Much of what property
does, in terms of setting up things and defining rights over them, involves fragmentation
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concurrent uses and estates in real property as well as intellectual
property.103 Thus, like a copyrighted book or musical composition,
personal data could be licensed only for specified uses that are ame-
nable to the owner.104
The divisibility of uses for health information is clearly desired by
some, as evidenced by recent litigation. In Greenberg v. Miami
Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc., the plaintiffs who pro-
vided genetic information to a research institution claimed that they
consented to its use for genetic research, but not for commercial
exploitation or patenting.105 In their case against Arizona State
University, the Havasupai Indian tribe argued that its members’ con-
sent to diabetes research did not extend to schizophrenia or human
migration research.106 And the plaintiffs in Beleno v. Lakey argued
that their consent to the use of their children’s DNA for birth defect
screening did not extend to epidemiological or other research.107
While none of these cases explicitly recognized a property
interest in IHI, the ability to subdivide and specify uses of biomedical
data, particularly genetic information, already exists to some degree
under government regulations. For example, the National Library of
Medicine’s Database of Phenotypes and Genotypes (dbGaP) has for
years permitted research studies to specify multiple “consent groups”
that limit future use of data to narrowly defined purposes,108 though
and separation. . . . [S]eparation is the key to entity property . . . .”); Litman, supra note 3,
at 1299–1300 (discussing problems with free alienability of personal data outside the health
context).
103 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2012) (“Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be
transferred . . . and owned separately.”). Thus, a copyrighted book may be licensed
separately in different geographical regions, for distribution in hardcover, paperback, and
audiobook forms, for translation into different languages, for use in film and television,
and in product and apparel merchandising.
104 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 3, at 1428–29 (proposing a property interest in personal
information resembling copyright protection); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 2094–98 (2004)
(proposing limited “hybrid inalienability” for personal information); see also Baron, supra
note 40, at 382–83 (discussing Schwartz and Cohen proposals).
105 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1075 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
106 See Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2008), discussed in Contreras, supra note 42, at 22–23.
107 See Beleno v. Lakey, 306 F. Supp. 3d 930, 936–37 (W.D. Tex. 2009), discussed in
Contreras, supra note 42, at 21–22.
108 For example, in the Alzheimer’s Disease Sequencing Project (ADSP) hosted on
dbGaP, there are six different “consent groups” with different usage restrictions, including
use solely for Alzheimer’s Disease research, research on any neurodegenerative diseases,
any research conducted by nonprofit entities, any health/medical/biomedical purposes, and
purposes excluding the study of population origins or ancestry. NAT’L INST. ON AGING
GENETICS OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE DATA STORAGE SITE, CONSENT LEVEL GUIDELINES
1 (2019).
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the effectiveness of these restrictions, which have no practical means
of monitoring or enforcement, is questionable.109 Today, however,
data intermediaries seek to enable this type of divisibility through the
Blockchain, allowing individuals to specify, on a case-by-case basis,
the permitted uses for their IHI—a technological approach that could
well succeed.110
But even if technologically feasible, the infinite divisibility of IHI
uses poses both practical and ethical challenges. At a practical level,
restricting the use of IHI to particular types of studies limits both the
value of the data for research and the capacity for broad-ranging
investigation and discovery. Researchers, let alone consumers, have
little idea what new avenues of research will emerge from existing
studies, and constraining the use of data to only one disease category
or metabolic pathway could handicap future research.111 Moreover,
the selective exclusion of certain research areas from data usage per-
missions has the potential to bias research and skew results (so-called
“consent bias”).112
In a more pernicious vein, allowing individuals to exercise
autonomy by selecting permitted uses of their IHI can lead to both
implicit and explicit discrimination. For example, should individuals
who harbor animus toward members of particular population groups
(e.g., based on race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation) be per-
mitted to exclude the use of their IHI in research or public health
interventions beneficial to those groups? To put it more bluntly,
should a homophobe be permitted to allow the licensing of his or her
IHI for research on cancer, but not on HIV? Should a racist be per-
mitted to allow research on melanoma, but not on Tay-Sachs disease
(which disproportionately affects Jewish populations)?113 From the
109 See Jorge L. Contreras, Leviathan in the Commons: Biomedical Data and the State, in
GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS, 19, 31–32 (Katherine J. Strandburg, Brett
M. Frischmann & Michael J. Madison eds., 2017) (questioning the effectiveness of NIH
policing and enforcement of policies regarding dbGaP).
110 See Kish & Topol, supra note 19; Roberts, Pereira & McGuire, supra note 16, at 19.
As long ago as 2010, a governmental advisory panel encouraged the development of data
“tagging” technology that would enable individuals to embed elements of their health
records with privacy and usage preferences. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI.
AND TECH., REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO
IMPROVE HEALTHCARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD 78 (2010).
111 For example, considering the Alzheimer’s data discussed in note 108, supra, data
tagged for use only in Alzheimer’s research could not be used for cardiac research if, years
later, a link were discovered between genetic markers for Alzheimer’s and heart disease.
112 See Contreras, supra note 42, at 30, 46 (reviewing literature on consent bias);
Roberts, supra note 5, at 1141 (same).
113 While prohibitions could be put in place to prevent blatant attempts to discriminate
against protected classes, such prohibitions would be difficult to manage if expressed in
terms of medical conditions, rather than racial, ethnic, or religious categories.
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standpoint of social justice, enabling such discrimination would be
abhorrent, no matter how deeply individuals desire to exercise their
autonomy in this regard.
B. Valuation and Compensation
Closely associated with the right to alienate one’s property is the
right to be paid for it.114 Indeed, as discussed in the Introduction,
charging for the use of IHI appears to be one of the driving forces
behind recent efforts to propertize IHI. Yet difficult questions emerge
regarding the amount of consideration that can, or should, be charged
for IHI. It is often the huge disparity between what unwitting research
subjects receive (nothing) and the profits generated from discoveries
enabled by their tissue and IHI that shapes popular attitudes toward
compensation for medical discoveries. Among the issues on which the
media focused in the story of Henrietta Lacks was the total absence of
compensation to Lacks’s descendants in view of the huge profits
earned by companies commercializing her cell line.115 But, of course,
even if Henrietta Lacks had been capable of negotiating with her phy-
sicians over the use of her cells, neither she nor they would have had
any way of knowing their true value ex ante.116
It is this uncertainty regarding the value of any individual ele-
ment of IHI that makes proposed transactional systems questionable.
Because the true value of an individual’s IHI will often remain
unknown until years after the contribution, the vast majority of IHI
elements will simply be tiny pieces of a huge, population-wide mosaic.
For these reasons, no individual with disproportionately valuable
IHI can realistically hope to receive its true value up-front. Thus, if an
individual wishes to share in the profits of a blockbuster drug or the
next HeLa cell line, he or she will require some form of profit sharing
or “reach-through” royalty arrangement117 with downstream users
114 Of course, having a property interest in something is not a strict requirement for
being compensated for its use. Issues of compensation could just as easily arise in
connection with an individual’s conditional consent to provide a blood sample to a data
gathering company. However, given the emphasis placed by the new crop of data
intermediaries on compensating individuals for “their” data, this discussion is an important
part of the overall propertization picture.
115 Matthew C. Nisbet & Declan Fahy, Bioethics in Popular Science: Evaluating the
Media Impact of the Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks on the Biobank Debate, 14 BMC
MED. ETHICS 1, 5–6 (2013) (noting that seventy-two percent of media accounts analyzed
described compensation as an ethical issue in the Lacks story).
116 In fact, the unique “immortal” character of her cells was only discovered
accidentally, and never mentioned to Lacks during her lifetime. See SKLOOT, supra note 7,
at 40–42, 89–107.
117 Reach-through royalties are contractual arrangements under which the owner of a
patented research tool (e.g., a reagent or molecular probe) seeks to collect royalties on
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(pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers, healthcare prov-
iders, etc.).118 Yet pharmaceutical manufacturers and biotech compa-
nies have, by and large, proven unwilling to pay reach-through
royalties even to the developers of groundbreaking research tools.119
It thus seems unrealistic to expect that these firms will commit to
make reach-through payments to data intermediaries or millions of
individual IHI owners when the contribution of any given element of
IHI to an eventual drug or biomedical product is likely to be minis-
cule, difficult to track, and many years away.120
In this scenario, the result of IHI propertization is likely to be the
distribution of trivial payouts to a large number of individuals,121
while the new data intermediaries profit through the collection of
transaction fees.122 And the estimated multi-billion-dollar global
“market” in IHI?123 A steep new tax on biomedical research and drug
development that will most likely be passed along to the consumer in
the form of higher healthcare costs.124
What’s more, participation in the IHI marketplace is not
mandatory. Every individual will be able to decide whether or not the
fees offered for sharing her IHI adequately compensate her for the
discoveries made using the research tool, but which are not themselves covered by the
patents on the tool. See Alfred C. Server, Nader Mousavi & Jane M. Love, Reach-Through
Rights and the Patentability, Enforcement, and Licensing of Patents on Drug Discovery
Tools, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 21, 23 (2009).
118 Data intermediaries such as Invitae are reported to have offered to share their
profits with individual IHI owners. See Roberts, Pereira & McGuire, supra note 16, at 18.
However, such profit sharing will not result in a windfall to the individual unless the
intermediary has a profit sharing arrangement with its data customer (the pharmaceutical
manufacturer or healthcare vendor), which, as discussed above, seems unlikely.
119 See, e.g., Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared: Hybrid Exchange Strategies as
a Source of Distinction at the Boundary of Overlapping Institutions, 116 AM. J. SOC. 341,
361–68 (2010) (describing DuPont’s failure to extract reach-through royalties on the
Harvard-invented oncomouse).
120 One notable, but small, exception is PXE International (PXEI), a patient advocacy
group that uses contractual mechanisms (not property law) to ensure that contributors of
DNA and tissue samples are compensated for their use. See Sharon F. Terry et al.,
Advocacy Groups as Research Organizations: The PXE International Example, 8 NATURE
REVS. GENETICS 157, 157 (2007).
121 See Brown, supra note 17 (noting the meager payouts offered by health data
companies).
122 See Cutler, supra note 10 (“[A]ny flat compensation would likely not be very
much . . . .” (quoting Hank Greely, director of Stanford University’s Center for Law));
Roberts, Pereira & McGuire, supra note 16, at 19 (“[T]he most equitable compensation
model would be to pay each person equally for sharing data.”); see also Angrist, supra note
14, at 45; supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
123 See Merken & Elfin, supra note 10.
124 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 1388 (“[D]ata privacy opponents argue that increased
protection would impose unreasonable costs on routine consumer transactions—costs that
consumers themselves ultimately will have to bear.”).
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attendant loss of privacy. And if every IHI owner receives the same
modest fee for her data, then the wealthier the individual, the more
likely she is to forego the payment and retain her data as private. The
result would be a skewing of collected IHI toward lower-income indi-
viduals (i.e., those who value the modest fee more highly than their
privacy). This skewing has the potential both to distort the results of
IHI research and also to target disadvantaged communities
unfairly.125
C. The Silent Majority—Unstewarded Data
If a personal property interest in IHI is recognized, it would pre-
sumably be recognized with respect to everyone, whether or not they
have appointed a data intermediary or downloaded an IHI app. At
the outset, and even over the long term, it is likely that only a fraction
of the population will avail itself of the technological means to control
and convey their IHI. A significant segment of the population (prob-
ably skewed toward lower socioeconomic status and educational
attainment) could thus lack the means to authorize the use of their
IHI and thereby profit from it.126
Today, as patients have no property interest in IHI, healthcare
providers are free to convey this “unstewarded” information to
biomedical researchers and public health officials at their discretion,
subject to applicable privacy and research regulations.127 In a world of
propertized IHI, however, this flexibility will disappear. Any unautho-
rized conveyance of IHI would constitute a conversion. Thus, under a
propertized IHI regime, far less information could be available for
research and public health uses. The data gaps arising from such selec-
tion bias could skew research results and prevent findings relevant to
omitted populations.128
125 Professor Richard Posner poses a similar scenario in arguing that the Bureau of the
Census should not be required to purchase information from the general populace, and
that data should not be owned by individuals more generally. Richard A. Posner, The Right
of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 397–98 (1978).
126 See, e.g., Megan Prictor, Harriet J.A. Teare & Jane Kaye, Equitable Participation in
Biobanks: The Risks and Benefits of a “Dynamic Consent” Approach, FRONTIERS PUB.
HEALTH (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6133951 (noting
that participants in biomedical research are generally biased toward “white, middle-class,
higher-educated people in most Western countries, to the exclusion of indigenous groups,
the socially-disadvantaged and the culturally and linguistically diverse”).
127 For example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule contains strict limitations on a healthcare
provider’s ability to disclose or share personally identifiable health information. 45 C.F.R.
§§ 160, 164 (2012).
128 See INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY,
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 209 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009) (discussing
selection bias arising from individual unwillingness to consent to research); Contreras,
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D. Perpetual Duration
As a general matter, property lasts forever. A chattel retains its
character as somebody’s property so long as it exists. As IHI is rela-
tively indestructible and difficult to abandon, propertized IHI would,
absent some statutory limitation,129 have perpetual duration.
A perpetual IHI property right could be problematic in a number
of ways. First, a particular datum may exist within the research estab-
lishment for a long time. For example, researchers in the 1950s col-
lected data regarding the effects of radiation exposure on survivors of
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear detonations.130 This data has
been used for decades in countless studies and radiation safety assess-
ments.131 Studies cite and build upon one another. It is unlikely that
researchers conducting a radiation study today could point to any spe-
cific use of original Hiroshima data, yet prior generations of studies
upon which they may rely undoubtedly made use of this original data.
Is the expectation of today’s data propertization proponents that orig-
inal data owners (and their heirs) would continue to profit from work
done generations after an initial study was completed? The difficulty
of tracking this data through successive generations of studies that do
not make use of primary data, but instead rely on prior studies’ results
and conclusions, is mind-boggling.
The degree of complexity increases with respect to population
and epidemiological studies. For example, a nationwide study of lung
cancer incidence would involve health data not only from lung cancer
patients, but also from unaffected individuals (control groups).132 An
entire population is implicated in many such studies.133 Is the expecta-
tion that every person, ill or healthy, who “contributed” to the scien-
tific understanding of a particular disease or condition profit in some
way from the result of such studies (e.g., a lung cancer treatment
developed decades later)? Because traditional property interests do
not disappear even as they become smaller parts of the overall data,
the complexity involved in such an undertaking could be intractable.
supra note 42, at 30–31 (noting the impact of selection bias on underrepresented
communities).
129 See infra Section III.A.2 (discussing potential durational limitations for IHI
property).
130 See Yukiko Shimizu et al., Radiation Exposure and Circulatory Disease Risk:
Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivor Data, 1950-2003, BMJ, Jan. 14, 2010, at 1.
131 See, e.g., id.
132 See Patricia M. de Groot, The Epidemiology of Lung Cancer, 7 TRANSLATIONAL
LUNG CANCER RES. 220 (2018) (detailing a national study of lung cancer in the United
States).
133 See, e.g., id.





      10/04/2019   07:34:32
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-4\NYU402.txt unknown Seq: 26  3-OCT-19 12:52
October 2019] HEALTH DATA OWNERSHIP 649
E. Orphan Data and the Dead Hand
The survival and inheritance of property after the original
owner’s death exacerbate the problems inherent in a perpetual form
of property. That is, unless the proposed rules regarding IHI termi-
nate ownership at the death of the original data subject,134 rights in a
deceased individual’s IHI would naturally flow to his or her estate.
Does each of a decedent’s heirs succeed to an undivided joint owner-
ship interest in the decedent’s IHI? Given the intangible nature of this
property, how will they even know what property they have inherited?
If the task of identifying and managing this inherited property is diffi-
cult for the decedent’s heirs, it is even more difficult for the many
hospitals and research institutions that will use that information (e.g.,
if the decedent happened to be part of that nationwide lung cancer
study). How would a drug company that sought to develop a lung
cancer therapy identify, let alone compensate, the scattered heirs of
every individual counted in the study? This problem is akin to that
experienced with “orphan” works—books and other copyrighted
materials that are old but still covered by copyright, and as to which
the copyright owner(s) cannot be located.135 These works, which are
often out of print and difficult to obtain, languish in a no-man’s land
in which they cannot be reprinted or digitally reproduced and are thus
excluded from the store of human knowledge.136
Even more challenging is the original (deceased) owner’s right to
exercise control over the use of his or her IHI after death. This is the
traditional property law issue of “dead hand” control—the ability of
deceased property owners to dictate, either through a will or trust
instrument, how their property may be used long after their deaths.137
Today, this type of control has gradually crept into policies regarding
certain types of IHI. For example, donors of tissue, DNA, and genetic
data may have limited rights through the exercise of informed consent
to control and limit the use of these resources after death.138 The
134 See infra Section III.A.2 (describing fixed durations for IHI).
135 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION: A REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2015).
136 See Olive Huang, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding Homes for
the Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 265 (2006).
137 See, e.g., LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 2 (1955).
138 The National Institute of Health’s (NIH) 2014 Genomic Data Sharing (GDS) policy
provides that individual consent is required in connection with research conducted on any
human genetic material obtained using NIH funding, whether or not the data is
anonymized, and whether the donor is living or deceased. See Final NIH Genomic Data
Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,345, 51,347 (Aug. 28, 2014); see also Jorge L. Contreras,
NIH’s Genomic Data Sharing Policy: Timing and Tradeoffs, 31 TRENDS GENETICS 55, 55
(2015). Some state informed-consent laws and institutional ethical guidelines regarding
informed consent also impose requirements regarding deceased individuals. See NAT’L
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National Bioethics Advisory Commission has opined that if an indi-
vidual restricts the use of his or her genetic material while alive, those
restrictions should continue to apply after death.139 The recognition of
traditional common law property rights in IHI would extend this
dead-hand control to all IHI, creating significant barriers to data reuse
even when new applications or research avenues are discovered.
III
POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FOR IHI
PROPERTY
As discussed in Part II above, the application of a traditional per-
sonal property regime to IHI could result in a range of unexpected
and undesirable consequences: taxing administrative systems and
yielding negligible financial benefits to individuals, while increasing
healthcare costs and potentially stifling biomedical research and
public health monitoring. Nevertheless, property theorists might dis-
miss these threats as illusory—property need not impose such burdens
if it is suitably limited and constrained. After all, “property” today is a
flexible concept rife with limitations, exceptions, and exclusions.140
Newer property systems, such as those developed under federal stat-
utes governing patents and copyrights, as well as judicially crafted lim-
itations and exceptions to common law property regimes, contain a
broad range of modifications to an absolute conception of property.
These are broadly referred to as “limitations and exceptions.”141 Such
limitations and exceptions could conceivably be applied to a new
property system for IHI—either through statutory enactment or judi-
cial decisionmaking—to mitigate the worst effects of “long and
strong” property protection described in Part II. This Part considers
the nature and viability of such limitations and exceptions in the con-
text of propertized IHI.
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS:
ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 29 (1999).
139 See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 138, at 49. See generally
Contreras, supra note 42, at 26–27 (discussing dead-hand control over genetic material and
data).
140 See Kevin Gray & Susan F. Gray, Private Property and Public Propriety, in
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 11, 15 (Janet McLean ed., 1999) (“The ideology of
property as uncontrolled exclusory power is nowadays just as untenable as is the
dichotomous distinction between the domains of the private and the public.”); Wyman,
supra note 49, at 186–87 (arguing that a contemporary theory of property is “malleable”).
141 See, e.g., COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 11–15
(Ruth L. Okediji, ed., 2017) (defining limitations and exceptions and giving a broad
overview of their significance).
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A. General Limitations and Exceptions Borrowed from IP Law
Limitations and exceptions to the scope and effect of property
rights exist in many areas of property law, particularly intellectual
property.142 Although IHI does not easily fit into any existing cate-
gory of intellectual property, certain limitations and exceptions that
exist under various intellectual property regimes may be useful to con-
sider when fashioning a property regime for IHI.
1. Fixation—Limiting IHI Property to Medical Records
As discussed in Section I.A.1, defining the moment when an ele-
ment of IHI is created can be difficult. One simplifying approach may
be borrowed from copyright law, which requires that a work of
authorship be fixed in a tangible medium before a copyright is recog-
nized in it.143 Under this reasoning, propertized IHI could be limited
to information that is recorded, most likely in an individual’s medical
record.144 Such a fixation requirement would address some of the
complexities that arise when trying to define IHI with sufficient preci-
sion. In fact, several commentators who have considered the proper-
tization of IHI have focused largely on ownership and control of
electronic medical records.145
But should the existence of an external artifact be the crucial
factor in determining whether IHI is property? What is a medical
record after all? In the traditional sense, it is a manila folder with a
multicolored label that resides in a doctor’s filing cabinet. Today, most
of these folders are electronic and housed in a central server run by a
health maintenance organization (HMO) or health plan. But what
about the heart rate and activity records measured by a Fitbit device
and stored in the “cloud”? Or the daily record that one keeps of her
caloric intake, jogging regimen, or blood pressure? Or the prescription
records generated by a local pharmacy? Or the DNA markers identi-
142 See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, Making Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach to
Copyright Exceptions and Limitations, 5 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 3 (2008) (detailing
the history of limitations and exceptions in copyright at the international level).
143 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
144 Professor Yaniv Heled has suggested, as an alternative, that IHI could be recognized
as an element of property once reduced to a form in which it may be communicated to
others—an “articulability” requirement. Thus, one’s temperature would not become an
element of IHI property until measured by some means that would allow it to be
communicated to another person, which might be earlier than it is recorded in a recognized
medical record. E-mail from Yaniv Heled, Assoc. Professor of Law, Ga. State Univ. Coll.
of Law, to author (Apr. 26, 2019) (on file with the author).
145 See, e.g., Kish & Topol, supra note 19, at 922 (discussing ownership and control of
medical records); Baron, supra note 40, at 369–70 (analyzing the roles of ownership and
control vis-à-vis medical records); Rodwin, supra note 43, at 593 (same).
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fied by a direct-to-consumer genomic testing company like 23andMe
or AncestryDNA? Or the chemical reaction that occurs within a home
pregnancy kit? Is all of this information part of a medical record? Is it
property?
Under copyright law, the fixation requirement is said to be neces-
sary “because only fixed works are at risk of misappropriation by cop-
ying.”146 Copyrighted works must thus be fixed “to ‘eas[e] problems
of proof of creation and infringement.’”147 These considerations do
not seem particularly relevant to IHI, and the imposition of a fixation
requirement on propertized IHI seems to draw a somewhat arbitrary
distinction between data that, in the eye of the individual, is otherwise
the same.
What’s more, the imposition of a requirement that IHI be fixed in
a tangible medium to be recognized as property, while making IHI
property more tractable, also cuts against the moral and intuitive
bases for propertizing IHI in the first place. That is, if an individual’s
claim to own information about herself arises from principles of
autonomy and self-actuation, why should it matter whether or not that
information is fixed in a tangible artifact?
2. Limited Duration
As discussed above in Section II.D, additional problems with
treating IHI as personal property arise from the perpetual duration of
personal property. These problems include dead-hand control, diffi-
culties of administering inherited IHI, and the diminishing value of
IHI over time. However, it might be possible to mitigate some of
these issues if IHI property were given a finite and limited duration, as
are many forms of intellectual property.
Under the federal statutes that authorize them, patents last for
twenty years from the date of filing,148 while copyrights in works made
for hire have durations of ninety-five years and those in other works
last for the life of the author plus seventy years.149 The right of pub-
licity under state law, which gives an individual the exclusive right to
exploit his or her persona commercially, is extinguished in many states
either upon death or the passage of a particular time period.150 Like
146 See Evan Brown, Fixed Perspectives: The Evolving Contours of the Fixation
Requirement in Copyright Law, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 17, 18 (2014).
147 Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051, 1054 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
148 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
149 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
150 See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR
A PUBLIC WORLD 3 (2018).
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these rights, IHI property could also be given a defined duration
based on the life of the individual or some other measure. Such a lim-
ited duration would eliminate at least some of the administrative com-
plexities raised by the inheritance of IHI property from one
generation to the next though, like many of the limiting proposals
made here, would also limit the compensation that would be received
for use of that IHI.151
3. Exhaustion and First Sale
The doctrines of patent exhaustion and copyright first sale pro-
vide that the use and sale of patented articles and copies of copy-
righted works may not be restricted after the first authorized sale of
such articles and works.152 By the same token, some form of exhaus-
tion could be imposed on IHI property so that after the initial “sale”
of data by the individual or his or her intermediary, further rents
could not be charged on downstream uses of that data. Such a limita-
tion would facilitate downstream scientific research using data that
has already entered the “stream of commerce,” as further consent
would not be required from the individual IHI owner. Like limitations
on the duration of IHI property, exhaustion may limit the compensa-
tion payable with respect to IHI over time.
B. IHI-Specific Limitations and Exceptions
The unique nature of IHI suggests that additional limitations and
exceptions could be imposed on IHI property.
1. Prohibitions on Compensation
Even if IHI is property, it is not a foregone conclusion that it
should be sold on the open market. As observed by Judge Mosk, dis-
senting in Moore v. Regents, “some types of personal property may be
sold but not given away, while others may be given away but not sold,
and still others may neither be given away nor sold.”153 And as law
professor Neil Richards recently commented about personal data,
“Not everything works better when we put dollar . . . figures on it.”154
151 In addition, the expiration of IHI property upon death would remove pathology and
autopsy findings from the scope of the property right, again leading to inconsistent
treatment of data and recordkeeping and tracking challenges.
152 See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1535 (2017) (patent
exhaustion); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 524–25 (2013) (copyright
first sale).
153 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 510 (1990) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
154 Cutler, supra note 10 (quoting Washington University School of Law Professor Neil
M. Richards).
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Thus, while several state and federal statutes recognize individual
property rights in human body parts,155 they also restrict an indi-
vidual’s right to sell (but not to donate) them.156 Likewise, individuals
may not sell themselves into slavery. Pregnant women may not sell
their fetuses. And payments to healthy “volunteers” who participate
in medical experimentation must remain modest so as not to exert
undue influence over their willingness to participate.157 Thus, the com-
pensation that individuals may receive for the exercise of property-
like rights with respect to their bodies and persona is regulated in a
variety of contexts and could also be limited in the case of IHI. Such
pecuniary restrictions, of course, would eliminate the incentive moti-
vating many of the aspiring data intermediaries mentioned above in
the Introduction.
2. Limiting Rights to Exclude After De-Identification
Others have proposed recognizing an individual property interest
only in IHI that is personally identifiable—in other words limiting
individual rights to exclude with respect to IHI after it has been “de-
identified” or “anonymized.”158 This approach could limit the impact
of IHI propertization on socially beneficial research and public health
activity, as it would allow public use of de-identified information
(most biomedical research does not require knowledge of an indi-
vidual’s name or address).
However, eliminating individual ownership of non-identifiable
IHI somewhat defeats the purpose of the propertization proposition,
as it would prevent individuals from being paid for the use of their
data in some of its most lucrative applications (e.g., drug discovery).
155 This was not always the case, and does not apply to all body parts or in all contexts.
See, e.g., LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR
HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE (2001) (providing examples of cases where
courts have determined that individuals did not have a property interest in biological
materials that had been separated from their body); Alix Rogers, Owning Geronimo But
Not Elmer McCurdy: The Unique Property Status of Native American Remains, 60 B.C. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 35–36) (on file with author) (discussing how
remains of Native Americans were deemed property of the federal government under the
Antiquities Act of 1906).
156 See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012); National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006).
157 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Payment and Reimbursement to Research Subjects -
Information Sheet, https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126429.htm
(last visited Apr. 18, 2019) (“Other than reimbursement for reasonable travel and lodging
expenses, IRBs should be sensitive to whether other aspects of proposed payment for
participation could present an undue influence, thus interfering with the potential subjects’
ability to give voluntary informed consent. Payment for participation in research should be
just and fair.”).
158 See Hall, supra note 24, at 661.
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What’s more, there is little theoretical justification for altering the
property status of an element of IHI based on whether or not it can be
traced back to an individual, particularly given both continuing
advances in technology that make the re-identification of individuals
from genetic data increasingly feasible159 and the recognition that
identifiable data (i.e., that which is informed by the full panoply of a
subject’s phenotypic and demographic characteristics) is often more
valuable for research than aggregate or anonymized data.160 This type
of limitation thus seems to be of limited value.
3. Authorizing the Use of Orphan IHI
As discussed above in Section II.E, IHI that cannot be traced to a
particular owner—“orphan” IHI—could be condemned to a state of
limbo in which it is not usable because the owner is not available to
consent to its use. The difficulties that orphan IHI could present to
both biomedical research and public health monitoring are substan-
tial. To mitigate this problem, several measures could be adopted.
First, a legal rule could be established simply to permit the use of
orphan IHI for specified purposes (e.g., research and public health).161
Second, more discretionary licensing of orphan IHI could be managed
by the government, possibly on a royalty-bearing basis with funds set
aside for eventual claims by IHI owners.162 In both cases, the potential
user could be required to use reasonable efforts to identify the owner
of the IHI.163
159 See Contreras, supra note 42, at 34 (“Perhaps the most critical shortcoming of
deidentified data exceptions is the growing realization that true deidentification of genetic
data may, in fact, be difficult or impossible to achieve.”); Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Trust
Me, I’m a Medical Researcher, 347 SCIENCE 501, 502 (2015) (discussing increasing
technological capability to re-identify individuals from DNA data).
160 See Lisa M. Austin & David Lie, Safe Sharing Sites, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (manuscript at 6) (“[S]trategies to mitigate the risk of re-identification affect the
accuracy of the data.”).
161 See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 135, at 47–48 (discussing exception-
based usage of orphan works). Cf. James Boyle, (When) Is Copyright Reform Possible?, in
COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 206, 222–25 (Ruth L.
Okediji, ed., 2017) (describing proposal in European Union to permit certain uses of
orphan works).
162 See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 135, at 48–49 (discussing government
licensing model). Cf. Boyle, supra note 161, at 222–25 (describing proposal in Europe to
allow limited licensing).
163 See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 135, at 56–59 (discussing “good faith
diligent search” for authors of orphaned works); Boyle, supra note 161, at 223 (proposing a
diligent search for authors of orphaned works “‘scale[d]’ to the nature of the project
involved”).
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4. Public Health Exceptions
Because IHI plays a critical role in public health monitoring and
intervention, it would be reasonable to permit public health authori-
ties to use IHI (not just orphan IHI, as discussed above, but all IHI)
without the express permission of the owner under certain circum-
stances. The circumstances under which such a public health exception
would apply could range from emergency situations (e.g., tracking
outbreaks of infectious diseases or food-borne illnesses) to any public
health activity (e.g., national health surveys or broad epidemiological
studies) to any legitimate public or private health-related research.
Along this spectrum, one would expect increasing resistance from
propertization advocates to exceptions that permitted private sector
pharmaceutical companies to profit from research on IHI without the
consent of (and payment to) IHI owners. However, excluding such
private sector researchers from this exemption could hinder socially
beneficial research. Moreover, it could further disempower, and result
in worsened health outcomes for, disadvantaged communities and
individuals who lack the expertise, desire, or wherewithal to control
the use of their IHI. Thus, if IHI is to become a form of property, the
broadest possible public health exceptions should be recognized.
C. Other Regulation of IHI Property
Sections II.A and II.B above discuss the imposition of different
limitations on the scope and enforceability of IHI property, over-
coming some of the problems (social welfare, efficiency, and adminis-
trability) that might be caused by the recognition of unrestricted
property rights in IHI. In addition to these limitations and exceptions,
it might also be possible to impose rules about the use of IHI property
that do not directly affect its character as property but which also seek
to overcome some of these problems.
In some cases, these regulations already exist. For example, the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) pro-
hibits discrimination based on individual genetic data by certain
employers and health insurers.164 While the scope of GINA is not all-
encompassing, it is a good first step toward preventing abuse of IHI by
potential users.165 In addition, in response to the issue of unstewarded
IHI,166 the government could appoint a data steward or ombudsman
164 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2(5), 122
Stat. 881, 882–83 (2008) [hereinafter GINA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 and 42 U.S.C.).
165 For potential expansions of GINA, see Contreras, supra note 42, at 45–46.
166 See supra Section II.C.
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to represent the interests of individuals who fail to appoint a data
agent or representative.167 Ancillary measures such as these, together
with the limitations and exceptions to IHI property discussed in
Sections III.A and III.B above, could mitigate some of the worst
effects of IHI propertization.
IV
AGAINST IHI PROPERTY
While each of the measures described above in Part III could
alleviate problems caused by property-based systems for IHI, each of
them could also be said to move the proposed system from a pure
property regime toward a system of governmental regulation.168 For
example, limiting the alienability of certain forms of property is pos-
sible, but, as noted by Baron, “the resulting powers retained by
owners might not have the consolidated, in rem qualities that, in the
eyes of some property theorists, make property distinct.”169 While an
absolutist version of property is clearly not required in order for prop-
erty rules to operate effectively, the creation of a new form of prop-
erty that is at the outset subject to a raft of limitations and exclusions
raises the question whether its treatment as property is actually
needed. As Jessica Litman argued nearly two decades ago, recognizing
a property interest in personal data would offer no more than “illu-
sory protections.”170
More importantly, property is a powerful legal construct that,
even with enumerated limitations and exceptions, confers on its
owners a host of rights and powers developed over centuries. While
this Article has sought to identify some of the most obvious ways in
which propertized IHI might cause social harm, systemic inefficiency,
and administrative headaches, it cannot predict every potential
problem that will occur down the road. Thus, the limitations and
exceptions proposed here, even if adopted one and all, cannot guar-
antee that propertized IHI will operate as expected, or in the public
interest. The creation of a new property system sui generis, with all of
167 Cf. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 135, at 48–49 (discussing potential
governmental representatives for orphan copyrighted works).
168 See United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he line between
regulation and property is difficult to draw with scientific precision . . . .”).
169 See Baron, supra note 40, at 372, 384 (“It may be that we can create a novel legal
regime . . . to deal with the problems particular to information. But at some point, the
departure of that regime from existing models of property might raise the question of
whether the regime deserves the name ‘property’ at all.”).
170 Litman, supra note 3, at 1302.
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the attendant rights associated with property, inherently creates risks
of unforeseen consequences.
To use a time-worn analogy, property can be analogized to a
bundle of sticks.171 When a new type of property is created, all of the
sticks—the right to exclude, the right to alienate, the right to use, and
so on—spring into being. We can eliminate or trim some of these
rights and powers at the outset with carefully crafted limitations and
exceptions. But even in the best of circumstances, this is a subtractive
process—we begin with a nearly infinite bundle of sticks and eliminate
those that cause systemic harm. But even the most farsighted social
planner cannot foresee every possible abuse or inefficiency that could
arise as technology and social structures evolve, especially in the fast-
moving area of healthcare technology. And once something is defined
as property, vested with constitutional protection against further
taking by the state, curtailing it further—whether through legislative
or judicial pruning—becomes difficult if not impossible.
One need look no further than patent law to appreciate the con-
troversy and legal uncertainty that can be generated when legislative
enactments can be construed as taking vested property rights away
from their owners without compensation (in this case, the enhanced
patent review and revocation procedures introduced under the 2011
America Invents Act172). In just a few short years, this debate has
resulted in no fewer than two Supreme Court decisions173 and an out-
pouring of legal scholarship and commentary.174 And these issues
171 Ownership rights in property are often described as a bundle of rights or,
metaphorically, a bundle of sticks, in which each “stick” represents a separate legal
entitlement with respect to the property. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct.
383, 391 (1979) (noting that the right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”); THOMAS W. MERRILL &
HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 17 (3rd ed. 2017) (“Property is a
‘bundle of rights’ or ‘bundle of sticks.’”); JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA,
PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 25 (2d ed. 2012) (“[P]roperty is often described
as a bundle of rights or, more informally, a bundle of sticks.”).
172 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 (2011) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19, 321–29 (2012)).
173 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1368 (2018) (“[T]he decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights—
specifically, the grant of a public franchise. Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration
of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct that
reconsideration.” (emphasis in original)); SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354
(2018) (holding that when a party challenges multiple claims of an issued patent, the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board can either institute review as to all challenged claims or none of
them, but not just some of the challenged claims).
174 See, e.g., Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
719 (2016); Camilla A. Hrdy & Ben Picozzi, The AIA Is Not a Taking: A Response to Dolin
& Manta, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 472 (2016); Greg Reilly, The Constitutionality
of Administrative Patent Cancellation, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 377 (2017); see also
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affect only a handful of inventors whose patents have been challenged
in administrative proceedings. IHI property, in contrast, would be
owned by every individual in the population—creating orders of mag-
nitude more claimants than have been affected by any prior govern-
ment taking, and making any post-recognition limitation of the scope
of IHI practically impossible.
For these reasons, some commentators, including the author,
have proposed that, rather than propertizing IHI, we continue to reg-
ulate individual health data through a combination of governmental
rulemaking designed to protect individual privacy and autonomy, sup-
plemented by individual tort remedies for abuses by researchers and
other handlers of IHI.175 Unlike propertization, this approach is addi-
tive in nature. Regulations and remedies can be created individually in
a tailored manner as needs become apparent, rather than wholesale
through the recognition of a generalized IHI property interest.
Fortunately, the principal elements of such a regulatory/liability
system already exist. Federal research regulations today impose
numerous restrictions on research involving IHI, such as permitting
research without the individual’s consent only if data has been de-
identified.176 Individual privacy in personal data is protected today
both through private tort law remedies177 as well as agency policing
and enforcement.178 While many feel that existing privacy protection
Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of
Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007) (discussing the issues before
passage of the AIA).
175 See, e.g., Contreras & Nordfalk, supra note 43, at 183 (“[P]roperty rule frameworks
are inadequate and inappropriate for the governance of human health data. Instead, we
support a combination of regulatory governance coupled, in some circumstances, with
private liability remedies.”); Spinello, supra note 42, at 41 (“Instead of relying on property
rights, privacy and autonomy should be safeguarded by strongly enforced laws that protect
genetic information by informed consent and tight regulations governing the disclosure of
such information . . . .”); see also Contreras, supra note 42, at 39–48 (reviewing existing and
potential rules for regulating the use of genetic data); Litman, supra note 3 (arguing that
tort and regulation approaches are superior to property for the protection of individual
data generally).
176 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2012); Evans, Barbarians, supra note 44, at 658 (arguing
that many protections sought to be achieved through property law already exist in the
regulatory frameworks that govern medical records and research); Leslie E. Wolf et al.,
The Web of Legal Protections for Participants in Genomic Research, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 1,
75 (2019); see also id. at 77–90 (discussing state laws protecting medical privacy beyond
HIPAA).
177 See Wolf, supra note 176, at 63 (explaining that a violation of HIPAA can form the
basis of a state tort law claim).
178 The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which is authorized to police unfair and
deceptive business practices, has monitored the collection and use of consumer data by
online vendors. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2016, at
1 (2017); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 1 (2000).
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is not strong enough, numerous proposals have been made to
strengthen protection along these lines.179 Patients whose healthcare
providers violate existing norms of professional ethics and care with
regard to the treatment and handling of IHI have remedies under
state medical practice laws and tort law.180 Laws such as GINA sup-
plement traditional protections by prohibiting discrimination using
genetic data.181 Access to IHI and even payment for data usage can be
achieved through well-understood contractual mechanisms without
resorting to property law.182
Thus, it is possible to construct legal frameworks based on con-
tract, data privacy, non-discrimination, and research ethics rules that
protect core values without the direct application of property law to
IHI.183 And given the complexities and inherent risks in creating a
new form of sui generis property, this approach may be preferable
even to an IHI property regime that appears at the outset to be appro-
priately limited and constrained.
CONCLUSION
While the recognition of personal property interests in IHI
appeals to notions of individual autonomy, privacy, and distributive
justice, the implementation of a workable property system for IHI
presents significant challenges. First, IHI does not fit recognized judi-
cial criteria for recognition as personal property, as IHI defies conve-
nient definition, it is difficult to possess exclusively, and the
justifications for its exclusive control are at best contested. If IHI
property were structured along the lines of traditional common law
property, as suggested by propertization advocates, such sweeping and
perpetual rights could impose prohibitive costs on socially valuable
179 See, e.g., GEORGE J. ANNAS, LEONARD H. GLANTZ & PATRICIA A. ROCHE, THE
GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY 66 (1995) (proposing legislation to enhance
genetic privacy); Clayton et al., supra note 1, at 7–10 (concluding that existing legal privacy
protections are inadequate and should be enhanced); Roche & Annas, supra note 1, at 393
(describing the need for greater privacy protection for genetic information).
180 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 502 (1990) (holding
that physician violated fiduciary duties to patient by exploiting tissue samples and data
without consent); Litman, supra note 3, at 1310–12 (discussing the use of tort law to
achieve privacy protection); Jessica L. Roberts, Genetic Conversion (Mar. 15, 2019)
(working draft), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3357566 (discussing
Moore and fiduciary claims).
181 GINA, supra note 164; see also Contreras, supra note 42, at 45 (discussing the
expansion of GINA as one of several alternatives to propertization of IHI).
182 See supra note 120 (discussing contractual approach taken by PXEI); Reichman &
Uhlir, supra note 73 (describing how contractual mechanisms can serve to limit use of
data).
183 For a detailed discussion of specific remedies arising from these forms of liability, see
Contreras & Nordfalk, supra note 43.
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research and public health activity and result in an unmanageable
system that would not address many of the autonomy and distribu-
tional concerns fueling the drive toward propertization. If IHI prop-
erty were instead to include limitations and exceptions on scope,
duration, and enforceability, as do some forms of intellectual prop-
erty, some of these problems could be overcome.
Nevertheless, there are inherent risks associated with creating a
new type of property in which owners are given broad rights of con-
trol and then relying on enumerated exceptions to mitigate the worst
effects of that control, especially when rights are distributed broadly
across the entire population and constitutional constraints make their
subsequent refinement practically impossible. Moreover, embedding a
host of limitations and exceptions into a new property system simply
to avoid the worst effects of propertization begs the question whether
a property system is needed at all, particularly when existing contract,
privacy, and anti-discrimination rules already exist to protect indi-
vidual privacy and autonomy in this area, and when one of the prin-
cipal results of propertizing IHI may simply be to enrich would-be
data intermediaries with little net benefit to individuals or public
health. For all of these reasons, this Article recommends that the
propertization of IHI be rejected in favor of sensible governmental
regulation of research using IHI coupled with existing liability rules to
compensate individuals for violations of their privacy.
